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LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
Christina B. Whitman*
At the time of his resignation, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. was
justly praised as a moderate, flexible jurist - open-minded, suspicious
of ideology, most often found at the center of a divided Supreme
Court. Yet Justice Powell was a man of deeply conservative instincts.
Suspicious of invitations to expand the scope of individual constitu-
tional rights, he was a participant and even a leader in the Court's re-
assertion of a federalism that emphasized deference to states and in its
reinvigoration of restrictions on access to federal courts. His jurispru-
dence was all of a piece. Justice Powell's reluctance to expand federal
court protection of constitutional rights coexisted with an unusually
personal sensitivity to the situations of individual litigants. He sought,
by counseling federal judicial restraint, to acknowledge with respect
and encourage the vitality of state and local communities, where he
thought people could most richly flourish.
Justice Powell's non-ideological conservatism reflected his own in-
nate courtesy and grace. It was tempered by, indeed based upon, hab-
its of empathy and compassion that were immensely appealing. These
humane and deeply personal values, rooted in the Justice's own per-
sonal and professional experiences over the six decades before he
joined the Court, both facilitated and blunted the Court's turn to the
right.
Had he never accepted appointment to the Supreme Court, it
would still be fair to say that Justice Powell had a spectacularly suc-
cessful personal and professional life. With the exception of a period
of service during World War II, most of it was spent in Richmond,
Virginia. All of it - college, law school, military service, and lawyer's
work - taught him the importance of close personal bonds, commu-
nity involvement, taking responsibility, a sense of belonging to a place.
He had a vivid sense of the personal rewards, as well as the costs, of
public service, and he thought it absolutely critical that institutions
that afforded the opportunity for service be nurtured and preserved.
For most of Justice Powell's legal career he was a partner in a
prominent Richmond law firm, but he was seldom simply in private
practice. His life was filled with commitments to the governing insti-
tutions of civic and professional life. He was, for example, president of
the American Bar Association, the American College of Trial Lawyers,
and the American Bar Foundation; chairman of the Richmond Public
School Board during a particularly tumultuous period; a member of
the Virginia State Board of Education; vice-president of the National
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Legal Aid and Defender Society; and a member of both a National
Advisory Committee on Legal Services to the Poor and a President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Jus-
tice Powell was extraordinarily conscientious in these offices. He
sought to leave each position having made a difference and, above all,
tried to use his influence to create more inclusive and enduring institu-
tions. He emerged from these experiences with a deep understanding
of the conflicting pressures on people who hold positions of authority
and a confidence that they would, as he did, struggle to do their best.
He also found public service to be enormously satisfying, basic to his
sense of personal as well as professional identity.
His experience of public service, his personal success, and his in-
volvement in World War II created in Justice Powell a solid faith in
American institutions. He was not oblivious to social problems, but
believed that solutions lay in the involvement of individuals working
together through vital public institutions. The law, and in particular
the Constitution, created the structure that made self-government pos-
sible by nourishing communities in which individuals could flourish.
Justice Powell had an unusually personal vision of the constitutive role
of the Constitution in a way of American life that he thought worth
preserving. He believed that state and local governments and the
more democratic branches of government were accessible to those
willing to compromise and negotiate. He was suspicious of those who
sought national solutions, for he saw them as shirking this difficult,
community-building work.
Justice Powell's beliefs led him to two characteristic, and superfi-
cially inconsistent, approaches to his role on the Supreme Court: as a
Justice, he continued to feel obligated by his belief that those in
authority should be attentive and responsive to the people who would
be personally affected by their actions, yet he was eager to give a clear
message that those seeking social change should not look to the federal
courts for solutions. When substantive issues of law were reached, he
tried to write with particularity and sensitivity about the consequences
for all the litigants, but in decisions based on issues of jurisdiction and
justiciability, he often reached for broad rules that would lead to clear,
door-closing results.
The felt need to consider, and articulate, the various interests af-
fected by a judgment is responsible for the balancing approach for
which Justice Powell has been both praised and criticized. Balancing
appealed to him for several reasons: it allowed him to articulate the
full range of views and interests implicated in a case, it expressed judi-
cial modesty by deferring broader decisions, and it held out hope for
losing litigants who might prevail in future cases. Most importantly,
balancing left those most familiar with particular problems free to
draw upon the full range of their local knowledge in devising solutions.
It gave constitutional space to local decisionmakers while modeling the
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inclusive process that the Justice hoped they would use. When Justice
Powell could see the human face behind an argument, he invariably
responded. If he thought that a majority opinion had failed ade-
quately to consider a particular perspective, it was his habit to write
separately - sometimes to qualify his vote, but often to give the ex-
cluded a voice. In his opinion in Keyes v. School District No. i,1 for
example, he spoke for the families of children, black and white, whose
lives might be disrupted by busing. In Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Co.,2 he sympathized with the white workers whose seniority ex-
pectations were displaced by the class relief approved by the majority.3
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,4 his respect for
both sides of the affirmative action debate led him to a middle ground
and a decision, joined by no other Justice but speaking for the Court,
in which "individualized consideration" of applicants was held to be
critical to the constitutionality of educational affirmative action pro-
grams.5
Justice Powell preferred judgments rooted in the specific facts of a
case. To give guidance primarily in terms of the various factors to be
considered held out hope of future success and cautioned lower court
judges to look closely. His opinions in cases involving the First and
Fourteenth Amendments best illustrate this quality. An obvious, and
influential, example is his opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge,6 which set
forth a three-part test for evaluating procedural due process claims. In
Ingraham v. Wright,7 he rejected a procedural due process challenge to
corporal punishment in secondary schools but left room for claims
challenging particularly severe beatings on either common law or sub-
stantive due process grounds. Gertz v. Welch, Inc.," a defamation case,
offered some protection for media defendants who acted in good faith
and some vindication for injured plaintiffs.
When Justice Powell found constitutional support for an individual
right, he took care that the right was defined very narrowly. It was on
these terms that he joined the majority in Roe v. Wade.9 More often,
he thought the best solution was not to support individuals in pressing
1 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
3 See id. at 781 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269 (i986).
4 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5 Id. at 38 n.52.
6 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
7 430 U.S. 651 (I977).
8 418 U.S. 323 (974).
9 410 U.S. 113 (973). Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(977), rejected an expansive interpretation of Roe. Yet he repeatedly voted to preserve the essen-
tial practical freedoms that made the core Roe right to choose abortion a reality. See, e.g., City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (979) (plurality opinion).
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claims against government officials, but to encourage both sides to see
their interests as ultimately congruent. Repeatedly, he spoke sympa-,
thetically of those responsible for governing community institutions.
In a well-functioning school, teachers were the benevolent protectors
of students. 10 In prisons, he felt, wardens struggled to do the best they
could, with inadequate resources, to provide a rehabilitative environ-
ment for prisoners.1 The law should be used to promote affiliation
rather than conflict. The supplicant's interest could be best protected
by supporting the official in his obligation to be responsive.
Justice Powell's opinion in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez,12 which flatly rejected the argument that school fi-
nancing systems should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, incorporated both his balancing approach, in
its articulation of the constitutional tests, and his deference to local in-
stitutions. It also illustrated the connection between Justice Powell's
sympathy for local decisionmakers and his willingness to send a clear
message that federal courts will not be available to decide certain
questions. He sounded that theme again in cases that interpreted Arti-
cle III standing requirements very narrowly' 3 and those that expanded
the personal immunities of local officials from constitutional litiga-
tion. 14
justice Powell's conservative impulses were a product of a faith in
the basic institutions of American life that he not only accepted but
exemplified. His own character and sense of civic obligation justified
his confidence in the responsiveness of those who possessed authority
and power. He made it easier for the Supreme Court to turn away
from its earlier activism by reassuring individuals that their voices
would still be heard and their interests respected.
10 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594
01975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
11 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 & n.16 (198i); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 404 (1974).
12 411 U.S. I (1973).
13 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (I975).
14 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo (1982).
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